Introduction
A creature has at least three logically distinct strategies for improving its fitness It can adapt to the environment, migrate to new surroutdings, or adapt tlle ermiromne~It itself In this article, I shall examine the third strategy, redesigning the environment.
The problem of when to adapt, when to redesign an environment, and when to search for a new habitat is broad enough to be treated as a general fact of life. Humans, no doubt, are among the few creatures who (explicitly) reason about this problem; but it is certain that other animals tacitly face a similar problem and that evolution has wired in a partial strategy for solving it. The reason we may expect creatures to have built-in strategies for redesigning their environments is that creatures with some active control over the shape of their environment will have an adaptive advantage over those who can adapt only passively to existing environmental structures. This follows because the number of tasks in which a creature can be designed to do well is limited, It is ulllikely that a design which alloBvs a creature to be evceptionally fleetfooted on flat terrains also will confer exceptional agility on rocky terrains. Design trade-offs must be made. If, however, a creature could somehow change the rocky terrain it visits (by making paths), or if it could augment its design with prostheses or tools (e.g., carry cups of water in dry regions, use &dquo;fishing sticks&dquo; to poke narrow crevices), its existing design becomes more adaptive.
We do not have to look far to find examples of how animals and humans modify their environments in adaptive ways. Beavers dam ponds, birds build nests, ants farm aphids, chimps leave useful nut-cracking stones in commonly used places (Kummar, 1995) , squirrels collect nuts for winter, and Egyptian vultures drop stones on ostrich eggs. In each case, the environment is warped to the creature's capacities rather than the other way around. This is to be expected within a classic adaptationist approach, for in the struggle for existence, organisms with these favored behavioral tendencies will outreproduce their competitors with less favored behavioral tendencies ; if these tendencies are heritable, the distribution of tendencies will change over generational time, with the favored tendencies becoming more common. Hence, classic adaptationism predicts that environmental modification will occur (Butler, 1995) .
Nonetheless, evolutionary arguments do not explain these traits are adaptive.
For that we must look to economic and ethological arguments. Thus, because foodstuffs are scarce in winter but plentifill and cheap in the fall, it is wise to stock up in the fill (standard inventory control principles). Because the probability of finding an ideal nesting site is small, at some point it becomes more cost-effective to build a nest in a suboptimal spot than to continue searching (investment analysis). And because good nutcracking stones take time to find, it is better to leave them where they will be most useful for everyone concerned than to discard them in arbitrary ways (amortize the cost of search). When such explanations are offered, we believe we have understood the phenomena better but, if we look closely, we note that behind such explanations there is an appeal to a notion of task environment that is distinct from the notion of the selective environment present in evolutionary arguments. It must be so, for the economic principles appealed to all show that a given behavior X is preferred to behavior Y with respect to a certain goal. They cannot show that behavior X is better than Y, all things considered. Thus, leaving around a nutcracking stone is desirable for the task of nutcracking, but it may not be a good tactic overall because it may have a side j f l l < > < I of cueing predators. What is good for a task in isolation may not be good when all tasks are considered together.
My objective here is to explain this notion of task environment in order to extend the range of analyses available to understand active redesign. ) will draw on ideas from computer science, economics, the theory of problem solving, and the study of interactivity to clarify what environmental redesign is and suggest ways we might measure its benefits.
This article is organized into five major sections. After this introduction, I distillguish the notion of a task environment from that of the environment more broadly construed. Task environments are substructures within a more all-encompassing selective environment. This distinction supplies us with the descriptive apparatus to pose the problem of environmental redesign in a natural way: Namely, how is a creature to change the structure of at lcast one task environment so that its overall performance-that is. its performance summed over all task environments-is improved. This global improvement may be achieved by enhancing performance in one or more task environments without reducing performance in any other (Pareto optimization) or by enhancing performance in one or more environments to more than compensate for any reductions incurred in others.
Because a task environment is a substructure within a larger selective environment, it is necessary to provide effective criteria for deciding which parts of the larger environment fall within a given task environment and which parts fall outside it. This is undertaken in section 3. Using the language of computer sciences, define the structure of a task environment to be a directed graph in which the nodes are states and the links are actions. Because not all actions available in the larger environment are allowable as moves in a particular task environment, we distinguish actions that are irrterrrnl to a task from actions that are cxtcmal. For example, actions that modify the structure of a task can be achieved only by performing Ictiolis that are external to the task. This distinction makes it possible to claim that creatures perform actions for the sake of redesigning a task environment.
The remainder of the article focuses on some of the Lliiicreiit types of ms~l'-o.rtrnrml actions available to both human and nonhuman animals for redesigning task environment. Two broad categories are distinguished: (1) external actions that change the topology of a state space and that we may expect to find prevalent in animal populations, and (2) external actions that change the cognitive congeniality of a space and that are an important and understudied feature of human and cultural adaptation.
Environments Versus Task Environments
The term elJlirolJl~lelJt, in normal biological parlance, refers to everything evogenous to a creature that may affect its physiology, experience, or death. This includes thc full range of external factors that may affect an agent's experience and motivationfactors affecting its internal state broadly understood-as well as all factors determining its possibilities for action and the consequences of its actions. For our purposes here, it will be sufficient to use the term (wnirnJrJrr('Jtt in a slightly narrower manner to refer to t~J(' I(t~l~lt~~ ot-CI/('S, Clll<ti'~llllts, 1'('sc~ll!'C('~, Illd ll'i1111,1C'1'S in a creatures world that determines its success, where sJJCCOcs means its differential reproductive success.
&;rtr (~~ncNf. then, means the &dquo;selective&dquo; environment (cf. Brandon, 1990) .
One feature of the notion of selective environment is that it abstracts from most of the microstructure in a creature's niche. If the environment is thc totality of external cues (Koza, Rice, & Roughgarden, 1992) .
The calculations here are based on simple microeconomic principles of optimization. The hard work, of course, is to discover the underlying tacts about the lizard environment that permit the cost-benefit curves to be constructed. For instance, it is necessary to determine both the probability of predation as a function of distance from the hiding spot and the probability of catching prey as a function of distance. This is now a well-acceptcd methodology in ethology. Once (Simon. 1955 (Simon, 1976) , workplace design (Kroemer, 1993) , human factors (Teichner, 1971) , and human computer interaction (Diaper, 1989) .
To bc more precise, let us follow Simon (1973) (Elster, 1979 (Harel, 1987 The &dquo;just say no&dquo; method bears closer scrutiny. Virtually every problem has difficult and easy instances in the sense that every algorithm designed to solve that problem will do worse on harder instances than on easier ones. The average complexity of a problem is given by the distribution of these difficult and easy cases (see Fig. 1 Batali and Kitcher (1996) Figure 3 , the expected utilities of the actions available to a lion at the same physical location can be plotted on two separate occasions. On the first occasion, before any special information-seeking actions have been taken, the lion must operate with prior probabilitic about the arrangement of large and slnall animals. On the basis of these prior probabilities, the clear choice is to attack Figure 3 ln thi> deCIsIOn tree. we see the expected l1tIlItIe~ ot ,lctlOn at the v.mw physic.)) )ocat)on on fBvo occasions: at II based on prior probabilities .llone..1l1d ,it t, it-tcr an BIIforIlI.1tlon-g,ltheflng acnoi has been taken. As long as the cost of information gathering does not exceed 1 1.5 l1nlt~. it is raoti.il to collect information before acting.
from the left flank, for the value of that attack is given by the sum of the expected utilities, which is 4.5. 011 the second occasion, the lion moves to a better viewing position and now has a commanding view of how this particular herd is distributed around the plain. Given this more informed idea of the organization of the herd, it is possible to know with very high rolltidenee-virtual certainty, let us suppose-what the payoffs will be from an attack from each flank. Thus, once at f2 the !ion will know whether it will catch a large, small, or no animal by attacking from a particular flank. However, because neither the creature (nor us) can know at tl which situation will obtain at ij, all that can be known is that once all information-gathering activity has been performed, the creature will be in one of three states of know!edge. It will know that it can secure a large animal or a sn7a11 anima) or no anin7al at all. Thus, at ti it knows that at t-, there is a one-third chance of taking a large anima!, a one-third chance of taking a small animal, and a one-third chance of taking no animal. Because the value of being at t~, is 5 and the value of being at ij is 4.5, any information-gathering activity that costs less than 0.5 is worth undertaking (Fig. 4 ), yet tic-tac-toe is a trivial game, whereas the game of 15 is not.
Imagine now that we are playing the game of 15 but Bve have been alloBved to transform it to a magic square. On each turn, player X chooses a card and nips it over on its place in the square, whereas player 0 chooses a card and takes it off the board (see Fig. 4 ). Clearly, this new arrangement of 1 S is cognitively more congenial than the first. It is not as congenial as tic-tac-toe itself, but it is a step in that direction. Like tic-tac-toe, the new arrangement allows us to extract much critical task information perceptually rather than by mental arithmetic and so it eI7COdeS needed information more c:iplicitl~~ (Kirsh. 1 '>9<) (Hutchins, 1995; Norman, 1988; Suchlnan, 1986) The simplest analysis of grouping is that it is done to encode plan fragments. 
